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Contracting over Privacy: Introduction
Omri Ben-Shahar and Lior Jacob Strahilevitz
ABSTRACT
This short essay introduces papers presented at the symposium Contracting over Privacy, which 
took place at the Coase-Sandor Institute for Law and Economics at the University of Chicago in 
fall 2015. The essay highlights a quiet legal transformation whereby the entire area of data pri-
vacy law has been subsumed by consumer contract law. It offers a research agenda for privacy 
law based on the contracting-over-privacy paradigm.
1. INTRODUCTION
Big Data is an engine of profound changes in our society and a major 
stimulant of economic growth. Internet services that never existed, like 
searching, social networking, and online shopping, are now a source of 
major personal welfare. The Internet of Things transformed machines 
that used to provide simple static functionality into data-intensive per-
sonalized aids. Overall, data-driven services and devices are widely em-
braced by consumers.
These “smart” products are popular because they use the vast infor-
mation network to help consumers improve usage and save money. But 
the firms that provide them also use the same data to determine people’s 
interests and shopping profiles and then make money by selling person-
alized “behavioral” ads and additional products. A mobile GPS app that 
tracks people’s location can help them get to their destinations more 
smoothly but also helps advertisers tailor location-specific ads. A tracking 
device that auto insurers offer to their policyholders can help price the 
policies more accurately and even reduce auto accidents and insurance 
premiums but also provides insurers a wealth of information about peo-
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ple’s behavior, information that might be used in ways their customers do 
not expect.
In the era of technology-powered phones, cars, alarms, wallets, tooth-
brushes, and physical activity trackers, users’ privacy has become a cen-
tral regulatory preoccupation. Around the world, lawmakers are trying 
to keep up with the commercial data-collection enterprise and to secure 
basic rights for their customers, like the EU’s “right to be forgotten” and 
its General Data Protection Regulation. In the United States, agencies like 
the Federal Trade Commission (FTC) and the Federal Communications 
Commission (FCC) have worked to tighten their oversight of firms’ data 
practices. There is, however, a percolating sense among privacy advo-
cates that the existing protective scheme is too weak, leaving too much 
freedom for firms to engage in surveillance and in monitoring of people 
and thereby to gain control over citizens’ lives in a way that threatens 
their autonomy, intimacy, authenticity, and other important values. The 
fundamental question that these lawmakers and privacy advocates are 
asking is whether “contract” has gone too far to subsume privacy law. 
Has it become too easy for people to contractually waive privacy rights? 
Are people even aware that they are doing so? Should the freedom to 
contract over privacy be restricted?
2. THE ECONOMICS OF CONTRACTING OVER PRIVACY
The case for stricter regulation of firms’ data privacy practices and the 
precise levers such regulation ought to deploy depend on the answer to 
a fundamental question: are markets failing to provide optimal privacy 
protection? In environments in which consumers care about their privacy, 
it might be thought that markets for data are the solution, not the prob-
lem. According to this standard line of thought, firms that want to lure 
consumers and prompt them to pay more for their services would prom-
ise their clientele greater privacy protection. In the same way that firms 
compete over warranties or the quality of customer service, data-driven 
firms could offer consumers privacy-protective platforms to gain a com-
petitive edge. Firms have learned, for example, that offering customers 
no- contract arrangements (which allow early termination of the service 
without penalty) appeals to noncommitters. Firms could similarly offer 
no-prying arrangements to appeal to privacy seekers. Markets, rather 
than regulation, could potentially provide the desired privacy features. 
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Indeed, some Internet service providers are offering pay-for-privacy plans 
that cost more but involve no data collection and liberate the bounty- 
paying users from behavioral ads and privacy disturbances (Bode 2016).
There are several specific market mechanisms by which privacy might 
be regulated, rather than by the government. The primary one is contract. 
Since the privacy practices that firms employ are part of the contract be-
tween the firm and the consumer (often included in the terms of service), 
this contract becomes a platform for regulation of the parties’ privacy 
rights. Consumers who give up some privacy receive in return something 
that they value more, often a price discount.
Regulation of privacy by contract occurs when firms promise to forgo 
otherwise available opportunities to use or collect personal information. 
They offer their customers a menu of choices, and people self-select. Like 
any other aspect of product quality, contracts can do the bulk of regula-
tion—of creating and limiting rights. In the same way that people choose 
the duration of their service contracts, the coverage declarations of their 
insurance contracts, or the data package for their smartphones, they 
would choose their personally desired privacy rules. Public regulation is 
generally not necessary to establish mandatory durations, declarations, 
or data allocations, and it would similarly not be necessary in setting pri-
vacy protection.
This conclusion is rebutted if contracting involves negative externali-
ties. There is some reason to think that choices about privacy and security 
could involve externalities, and the presence of these externalities ought 
to provide some basis for overriding personal preferences if the stakes are 
high enough (Allen 1999; Ayres 2016). For example, unraveling and re-
lated dynamics put significant pressure on people to keep up with  others 
who publicize personal information (Schwartz 2004; Peppet 2011). Like-
wise, firms may not compete over data security if highlighting such as-
pects alerts otherwise uninformed consumers to new risks and dampens 
overall demand.
Another limit to contracting is transactions cost. Ordinarily, this con-
cern suggests that law should play a relatively modest role of providing 
a set of privacy rights default rules. These privacy rights would govern 
the relationship between the firm and the client, but only in the absence 
of explicit contractual clauses on the matter. This is the gap-filling role 
that the law assumes in many other areas of contracting, and the main 
goal of preset default rules is to save the parties the hassle of expressly 
drafting them. The well-documented problem with this permissive regula-
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tory approach is its weakness. Firms are able to override the substantive 
provisions embedded in the defaults by asking their customers to agree to 
a different set of terms. Thus, in an era in which most consumer transac-
tions are accompanied by long predrafted standard-form agreements, and 
where it is exceedingly easy to elicit the consumer’s assent to the terms, 
much of the regulation of privacy rights would be performed by contracts 
drafted in-house, not by laws that establish default rules.
Finally, efficient contracting faces informational and behavioral bar-
riers. As in many areas of consumer contracting, the asymmetries in so-
phistication, knowledge, and stakes make it questionable whether con-
sumers would effectively self-select into the packages of legal terms that 
best serve their heterogeneous interests. Unlike service durations, insur-
ance declarations, or smartphone data allocations, privacy rights deal 
with matters that are not intuitive for consumers. It is enough to eyeball 
a typical privacy policy notice to realize that it governs mysterious issues: 
what type of information is being collected, how it is used, with whom 
it is shared, how long it is kept, and how it is protected. This complexity 
opens a fertile ground for the incorporation of behavioral factors into the 
understanding of privacy decision making (Adjerid, Samat, and Acquisti 
2016).
Failures of imagination are widespread in privacy contracting because 
new and unanticipated uses of old data are constantly arising. Privacy 
policies are often written in ways that are truly confusing (Reidenberg 
et al. 2016). Further, these privacy policies also change over time (firms 
include a modification clause in the notice, which allows them to make 
such changes). And even if understanding one such policy is manageable, 
they come in battalions. Each website, financial arrangement, visit to a 
clinic, or new mobile app presents its own privacy practices. Any effort to 
master this accumulated complexity is infeasible, and any attempt to do 
so is irrational. According to one estimate, the average person encounters 
so many privacy disclosures every year that it would take 76 days to read 
them, and the lost time would cost the economy $781 billion (McDonald 
and Cranor 2008).
The complexity of contract terms dealing with privacy is a major ob-
stacle for efficient private contracting. It poses a serious challenge for 
market regulation of privacy, but it may not be a fatal one. Privacy is not 
the only aspect of contracting that involves significant underlying com-
plexity. Many other dimensions of consumer contracts are complicated 
but nevertheless bargained over and tailored to consumers’ preferences. 
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Consumers do not understand the complexity of automobile mechanical 
design or the electronics that operate their laptops but are able to rely 
on market signals to make propitious choices. Their decisions are made 
manageable by various market-generated scores that aggregate the under-
lying loads of information and rate or rank the performance of the prod-
uct and the satisfaction that similarly situated consumers derived from it. 
Such market indices foster competition over the otherwise complex and 
obscure features and thus complement the contract mechanism.
Accordingly, a central question for the contracting-over-privacy in-
quiry is the viability of privacy scores and ratings designed to sim-
plify privacy choices. Some such tools are available, like the website 
 PrivacyGrade.org or the TRUSTe privacy compliance certification. Yet, 
unlike ratings from Consumer Reports or Zagat, these privacy scores are 
not relied on heavily. Is it because, despite being counseled otherwise, 
people do not care much about their data privacy?
The answer is probably yes: most people do not care much about 
data privacy. When prompted by surveys, they might nod in agreement 
and announce that privacy matters, but when asked to pay for it, they 
are strikingly stingy. Some studies have found that people are willing to 
pay no more than a few dollars to prevent their apps from harvesting 
their smartphone data, no more than half a penny per search to make 
it private, and no more than $15 per year to avoid automated content 
analysis of their e-mail messages (Savage and Waldman 2013; Preibusch 
2015; Strahilevitz and Kugler 2016). Maybe people will eventually learn 
to cherish their data privacy more, but at present the privacy tempest is 
in a teapot.
3. THE LAW OF CONTRACTING OVER PRIVACY
Contracting over privacy is of course permissible, but how do such con-
tracts form? What is the legal status of privacy notices posted on web-
sites, incorporated in mobile apps, or otherwise communicated to con-
sumers? Surprisingly, this basic question has not received a simple and 
coherent answer in the privacy law commentary. The lack of definitive 
analysis has produced puzzling treatments by courts and unorthodox 
scholarly proposals.
This question of whether online privacy notices are contracts has 
created confusion in part because privacy law is longing for a different 
This content downloaded from 128.135.205.193 on January 10, 2017 11:21:27 AM
All use subject to University of Chicago Press Terms and Conditions (http://www.journals.uchicago.edu/t-and-c).
S6 /  T H E  J O U R N A L  O F  L E G A L  S T U D I E S  /  V O L U M E  4 5  ( 2 )  /  J U N E  2 0 1 6
notion of consent than general consumer contract law. Privacy law as a 
whole is a collage of legal doctrines from different areas, still struggling 
to identify the common underlying values and objectives (Kugler 2014). 
For example, a recent draft of the Principles of the Law, Data Privacy 
counts numerous sources for the regulation of privacy, what it calls “an 
interrelated amalgam of different types of law, including federal and state 
constitutional law, federal and state statutory law, tort law, evidentiary 
privileges, property law, contract law, and criminal law” (Schwartz and 
Solove 2016, intro. note, p. 1).
Privacy law has an uneasy relationship with contract. It has under-
standable ambitions to regulate a desirable baseline of privacy rights but 
a less coherent view of whether these rights can be waived. On the one 
hand, it is widely accepted that even when the law establishes baseline 
privacy rights, individual consent could modify them. Individuals, for ex-
ample, could sell their rights by granting firms permission to collect, use, 
and share their personal information. This feature of the law appropri-
ately accommodates heterogeneous preferences among subjects with re-
spect to privacy and the associated tradeoffs. On the other hand, consent 
to standard-form contracts is hardly ever informed or meaningful, and it 
is hard to accept that such a passive ritual could undermine basic privacy 
entitlements.
Many of these issues are not unique to privacy rights. In other areas of 
contracting, courts have allowed passive assent to override pro-consumer 
legally enacted background rules. But what about privacy rights? Have 
they acquiesced to the same lenient contracting rules? Are consumers’ 
clicks to “agree” sufficient to disclaim privacy rights? Many lawsuits for 
violations of privacy rights turn on the question of whether consumers 
truly consented to the standard-form contract terms that purport to grant 
the business the right to engage in its data practices. And yet the answer 
to this question is thought to be unsettled. It is often taught that privacy 
contracting is treated differently by courts than contracting over other 
matters (like warranties or arbitration). It is also thought that such dif-
ferential treatment of privacy contracts is justified, because the guidelines 
concerning how to contract over privacy must come not from contract 
law but from privacy law.
As a result, despite the central role that consent has in establishing the 
scope of privacy rights, there is lingering confusion regarding the rules 
that govern the mutual assent to privacy terms. There is, for example, a 
prominent view that such rules must come from the doctrine of informed 
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consent in tort law rather than from consumer contract law (Schwartz 
and Solove 2014, sec. 4, comment A). Thus, rather than apply the ordi-
nary rules of mutual assent—for example, the rule that determines how 
standard-form contracts are formed and what counts as sufficient disclo-
sure—privacy scholars put their faith in privacy-specific consent rules and 
heightened notice requirements, which purport to apply only to agree-
ments over data privacy (Schwartz and Solove 2014, secs. 3–4). In their 
view, “[t]he form by which consent is obtained must be . . . based on the 
type of personal data involved and the nature of the collection, use, or 
sharing of the personal data.”
These heightened notice and assent requirements are inconsistent with 
first principles of contract law. In general, the doctrine of mutual assent 
requires parties to follow standard objective procedures, invariant to the 
content of the agreement. These procedures have evolved in the digital 
era, allowing standard contract terms to be adopted through relatively 
passive and spontaneous forms of agreement. But the assent rules are one 
and the same for all contracting matters—warranties, arbitration clauses, 
disclaimers, termination penalties—including privacy rights. Despite 
asymmetries between firms and consumers, courts apply the basic princi-
ple that individual assent overrides legally supplied protections and that 
the process necessary to contract around such default protections does 
not depend on their substance.
This principle—the content neutrality of contract formation doc-
trine—is overwhelmingly adhered to by courts. Its inverse—the idea 
that courts ought to adopt privacy-specific contracting rules—is likewise 
overwhelmingly rejected. A recent survey of all privacy disputes that 
reached court judgment paints a telling picture (Bar-Gill, Ben- Shahar, 
and Marotta- Wurgler 2016). Despite a holding by one court in the earlier 
days of the Internet that “broad statements of company [privacy] policy 
do not generally give rise to contract claims” (Dyer v. Northwest Air-
lines, 334 F. Supp. 2d 1196, 1200 [D.N.D. 2004])—a precedent that pri-
vacy scholars have taken as authoritative in describing the state of the 
law (see, for example, Solove and Schwartz 2011; Solove and Hartzog 
2014)—the law has shaped up quite differently. To date, among 51 cases 
in which courts addressed this issue, only in five cases did courts decide 
that privacy notices are not contracts. All the remaining cases treated pri-
vacy notices as contracts. While most of these cases are unpublished fed-
eral district court cases, the conclusion is crystal clear: privacy policies 
are typically recognized and enforced as contracts.
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What are the legal implications of the classification of privacy notices 
as enforceable consumer contracts? For firms, the contractual nature of 
privacy notices ensures two beneficial functions. First, privacy notices are 
deployed to shield firms against liability for data privacy practices that, 
absent consumer consent, would violate privacy laws. For example, ab-
sent consent, Gmail’s practice of scanning contents of users’ e-mail mes-
sages would be a violation of the Wiretap Act, and Facebook’s practice of 
identifying users in uploaded photos would be a violation of state privacy 
laws. The contractual status of privacy notices means that users grant 
consent to these practices and thus provide firms a critical safe harbor.
The second function that privacy notices perform is the assurance for 
consumers that some uses of the data, which are otherwise permissible 
even without consent, would not occur. For example, firms and websites 
may keep logs of customers’ activity, but they can promise in their pri-
vacy notices not to do so. If privacy notices are contracts, such prom-
ises are binding, and their breach would be actionable. Moreover, the 
FTC can (and does) treat breaches of these promises as deceptive trade 
practices. Avowing such potential liability is a credible way for firms to 
entice hesitant consumers to engage with them. Firms dealing with sensi-
tive content, like adult websites, indeed make explicit and clear promises 
to limit data sharing with third parties, and cloud-computing sites make 
explicit promises to follow stringent data security standards (Marotta- 
Wurgler 2016).
The contractual nature of privacy notices has significant implications 
for lawmakers working to design statutory privacy protections. The first 
implication is for the design of default rules. If statutory privacy rights 
are merely default rules, lawmakers should anticipate wholesale opt outs. 
Firms that develop business models that are constrained by statutory pri-
vacy rules would post privacy notices that effectively override these rules.
The powerful incentives of firms to induce their customers to give up 
their privacy rights also suggests that the choice between opt-in and opt-
out schemes is of less importance than people usually assume. Opt-in 
schemes are thought to be more protective, because they require firms to 
get consumers’ affirmative consent to override the pro-consumer status 
quo. Opt-out schemes, by contrast, put the burden on consumers to ini-
tiate the exit from the pro-business status quo. Recent FCC regulations, 
for example, present the shift to an opt-in regime as a meaningful step to-
ward more privacy protection, as this regime requires consumers’ explicit 
consent before collecting sensitive data such as geographical location or 
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financial information. But firms are very good at getting consumers to opt 
in when doing so furthers the businesses interest (Willis 2013), and busi-
nesses are able to ask consumers repeatedly to change their minds if they 
initially resist information sharing. If indeed firms elicit such consumer 
consent with great ease, the opt-in framework makes little difference.
Once again, consumers may so easily agree to opt in, or fail to opt 
out, because of lack of information. Informed consumers might refuse to 
opt in or might initiate their own opt outs. These consumers would walk 
away from firms that refuse to provide the statutory privacy protections 
that they demand. Uninformed consumers, by contrast, would stick with 
any default rule. In such an environment of imperfect information, de-
signing optimal default rules has to account for two separate concerns. 
First, it has to recognize that there are consumers who do care and who 
would seek to opt out of an undesirable default rule. For some, the de-
fault rule could be insufficiently protective, and they would look for more 
protection. For others, it would be too protective, and they would pre-
fer to waive the protection for a price discount. These opt outs create 
transactions costs (the cost of becoming informed about the default rule 
as well as the cost of contracting around it), and a well-designed default 
rule has to minimize such costs. But the design of the default rule has to 
recognize, in addition, that many consumers would remain uninformed 
about the default rule and refrain from opting out, regardless of its con-
tent. For this group the default rule is sticky, and it ought to be designed 
with an eye to maximizing the value of the transaction. This is a general 
insight into the optimal design of default rules in consumer contracts: it 
has to meet two criteria—minimizing the cost of opt outs and maximiz-
ing the value of transactions when opt outs do not occur (Bar-Gill and 
Ben- Shahar 2016).
An additional implication of the contractual nature of privacy notices 
is the role of disclosures. Contracts over privacy—like any other con-
sumer standard-form contract—are often long and complex. Is there a 
way to make such contracts simpler? Can the law require firms to pres-
ent consumers pared-down versions of these privacy notices that would 
effectively inform consumers of the privacy risks? These questions have 
risen to the fore of consumer protection law in many areas, as regula-
tors and commentators spend much effort to design simpler, smarter, and 
user-friendlier disclosures. In the privacy area, the proposals to utilize 
best practices in the presentation of privacy notices have been widely em-
braced, and more radical suggestions to use “nutrition facts”–type warn-
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ing boxes are also intuitively advocated. But would such efforts have the 
desired effect on informing consumers’ choices? There is some evidence 
that the answer is no (Ben-Shahar and Chilton 2016) and that the use of 
the privacy notice to engender trust may be limited (Martin 2016).
In the end, then, the law and economics of contracting over privacy 
differs only in detail, but not in principle, from the law and economics of 
consumer contracts. Courts overwhelmingly treat them in the same way, 
and for good reasons. Consumers’ consent may be ill-informed, but reg-
ulatory alternatives might be worse. Consumer contract law has tools to 
combat overreaching by firms, and these tools—rather than superfluous 
notions of heightened disclosure or informed consent—ought to guide 
privacy protection. Such tools allow courts to strike down intolerable 
provisions, and in a separate article we propose to deny firms the advan-
tages that they bury in cryptic boilerplate (Ben-Shahar and Strahilevitz 
2016).
Accordingly, the papers from the symposium Contracting over Pri-
vacy collected in this issue examine general questions of contract forma-
tion, design, interpretation, and extracontractual norms and trust—all in 
the context of privacy. Privacy is not sui generis; it is instead a valuable 
laboratory to examine the evolution of contract law in the digital era.
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